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Abstract 
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of acquiring company’s directors’ characteristics 
in mergers and acquisitions. M&A literature has studied ages the effects of different firm-, board- 
and deal-attributes. However, acquisition literature has more recently been raising interest towards 
corporate governance’s effects. More precisely, the interest has been in personal-specific features, 
such as experience. My study implies that boards with industry experience on target firm receive 
lower acquisition announcement returns in non-diversifying transactions. This finding is new to the 
existing acquisition- and corporate governance related literature.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The board of directors has a critical role in firm’s strategic decisions (Demb and Neubauer, 1992) 
which plays important role in the future profitability of the company. Mergers and Acquisitions1 are 
seen as one of the biggest investments companies make and they have a critical strategic role in 
generating profit for the both acquirer2 and the target. As acquisitions are important strategic 
investment decisions, the board’s role is highlighted in acquisitions and prior literature has found 
many board characteristics to affect the acquisition outcome. One of these characteristics is director’s 
industry experience. Director’s industry related experience has received rising public’s interest as an 
aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. As for example, Citigroup3 didn’t have any experienced 
outside directors on their board prior the crisis and stated to be recruiting several industry experienced 
directors to their board. 
The corporate governance literature furthermore has recent years viewed the effect of director 
experience on the target firm’s industry4. Related studies have found that in a diversification 
acquisition, the independent directors and CEO’s with experience on the target firm’s industry have 
a positive effect to the acquisition announcement returns (Wang, Xie and Zhu, 2015; Custódio and 
Metzger, 2013). Other studies, to the best of my knowledge, have found the effect of director’s target 
industry experience to have both positive and negative effects. However, none of these findings are 
statistically significant and they differ in measurement of the experience.  
The primary objective of my thesis is to test whether the acquiring company’s director experience on 
target firm’s industry effect on acquisitions outcomes. Furthermore, I talk through the different 
characteristics of the transactions made by the low- and high-experienced boards. I contribute to the 
existing corporate governance, and acquisition related literature by providing new evidence of the 
industry-experience-effects in corporate governance.  
                                                          
1 Definitions Merger, Acquisition, Deal and Transaction are used interchangeably. 
2 I use definitions Acquirer, Acquiring company, Acquiring firm to refer interchangeably to companies listed 
as acquirer in SDC Mergers and acquisitions database 
3 See Eric Dash, “Dean of Harvard Business School May Join Citigroup’s Board,” New York Times (July 9, 2008). 
4 I use Experience, Expertise, Industry experience, Industry expertise as a definition for director’s experience 
on the target firm’s industry unless otherwise specified. 
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In my thesis, I divide the experience into two different experience effects: the director’s board 
experience and the director’s employment experience on the target firm’s industry. As I test the 
performance of the acquisition, my focus is in the short-term performance as the relationship between 
acquisition and industry expertise is more straightforward. I test the short-term experience-effect with 
acquisition announcement returns to the acquirer. My finding is that both forms of experiences have 
negative effect on the announcement returns in non-diversifying acquisitions. I will also include a 
test for long-term acquisition performance to test if the acquisition increased the company’s efficiency 
or created synergies when it is measured with the change in the acquiring firm’s return on assets 
(ROA) from one fiscal year before announcement to one fiscal year after the announcement. My 
findings suggest that there is no relationship between both forms of experience and long-term 
acquisition performance. 
The structure of my thesis is the following. Section 2 consists of a review of the related literature 
regarding the director’s role on acquisition in generating announcement returns to the acquirer. After 
the review, I state my hypotheses. In Section 3, I introduce my sample, data sources and selection 
criteria. In section 4, I present my variables and methodology regarding the empirical analysis. In 
section 5, I will present a sub-sample analysis and discuss the differences of transactions and acquirers 
between low and high experienced boards. Next in section 6. I present my empirical results and will 
discuss them in section 7. Lastly, in section 8, I conclude my findings. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Ways the acquirer’s board of directors create value in acquisitions 
As mentioned earlier, the board of directors play an important role in acquisitions by approving or 
disapproving the acquisition investment-decisions, and giving valuable advice when executing the 
acquisition. The board and directors impact the acquisition performance through both monitoring- 
and advising-channels.  
The monitoring-channel affects through independent directors, who monitor the firm’s decisions 
through shareholders point-of-view and reduce agency problems between shareholders and 
management (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Fama, 1980). In addition, independent director’s 
monitoring prevents managers from making value destroying acquisitions (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). 
These effects do not limit to only independent directors. Raheja (2005) shows that the inside directors 
also affect the company’s performance through the monitoring-channel as inside directors may 
understand firm-specific information more deeply lowering information asymmetry allowing the 
board to monitor more efficiently.  
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The advising-channel affects through director-specific knowledge and includes both inside and 
outside directors, as board members are usually picked for having specific expertise (Masulis and 
Mobbs 2011, Wang, Xie and Zhu, 2015). These director-specific characteristics make advising more 
valuable to the management, driving them into making better performing acquisitions and create 
value to the firm’s shareholders (Byrd and Hickman, 1992, Masulis and Mobbs 2011, Wang, Xie and 
Zhu, 2015).  
2.2 The effect of directors’ industry expertise in acquisitions 
The most easily noticeable experience-effect of directors’ industry expertise comes through the 
advising-channel. The directors having relative experience from the industry prevent the shareholders 
from having value-destroying acquisitions as they share their knowledge and advice the management 
(Wang, Xie and Zhu, 2015; Byrd and Hickman, 1992). The effect comes also through the monitoring-
channel, as a result of decision-making quality by approving or disapproving the acquisition the 
management has proposed (Bhagat and Black, 1999). They claim the monitoring-effect is harder to 
seize, because the acquisition decisions, just as other important company decisions, are made in 
private and thus happen before the possible actual acquisition. The ways industry expertise creates 
value via these two channels is discussed more in sections 2.4 and 7. 
Directors target industry experience has been found to have an effect on the acquisition performance 
in diversification acquisitions (Wang, Xie and Zhu, 2015). The finding suggests that experienced 
directors have a positive impact when facing acquisition between industries, as the acquirer is likely 
to overpay for target firm and this management action destroys shareholder’s value (Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1990).  
As mentioned earlier, other studies have failed to find a statistically significant effect between 
directors’ industry experience (e.g. Field and Mkrtchyan, 2017). However, Custódio and Metzger 
(2013) show that there is an effect between CEO industry experience and acquisition performance. 
The value is created through bargain-ability capturing greater proportion of surplus, paying smaller 
premiums and engaging in value increasing acquisitions. These effects are similar to the effects 
created director experience can create through advising-channel. 
I expect the effect of long-term acquisition performance and industry expertise to be indirect, since 
the expertise plays a role in the acquisition-process by choosing and executing value adding 
acquisitions (i.e. valuing the target, operating efficiency benefits and synergies correctly). As 
mentioned earlier, the directors’ role includes many other tasks non-related to acquisitions. The 
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experienced directors thus can increase long-term performance of the firm also through other ways 
than acquisition-related, but through the same monitoring- and advising-channels.  
2.3 Other board and director characteristics 
Besides director experience, related studies have found other director and board characteristics to 
have an influence in acquisitions announcement returns to the acquirer. Also, prior studies show that 
acquirer and deal characteristics affect the announcement returns. I introduce these effects in this 
section and discuss more detailed in section 4.3. 
Directors’ role has focused in acquisition-related literature on boards and director’s characteristics, 
such as boards independence, directors financial experience and prior acquisition experience (e.g. 
Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Güner, Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Field 
and Mkrtchyan, 2017). Literature has found that these characteristics affect the acquisition outcomes 
through both the monitoring- and advising-channels, and the literature aims to increase the knowledge 
and importance of corporate governance in acquisition performance.  
Other than director characteristics, various earlier studies have furthermore proven deal- and acquirer 
related characteristics to affect the acquisition announcement returns. Acquirer related characteristics 
known to have an effect in acquisition performance include such characteristic as: acquirer’s size 
(Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004), leverage (Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell, 1993) and 
past performance (Rosen, 2006). Deal related characteristics include: acquisition of public vs. private 
firms (Capron and Shen, 2007), payment type (e.g. Travlos, 1987), diversifying acquisitions (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1990), acquirer’s use of financial advisor (Rau, 2000) and deal size (Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoller, 2002; Alexandridis, Fuller, Tehaar and Travlos, 2013). 
2.4 Hypotheses: 
The monitoring-channel can enable directors having relevant industry expertise to create value and 
prevent bad acquisitions. Directors with industry expertise understand the firm’s and industry’s 
unique characteristics more deeply, such as its competitive landscape, problems and opportunities. 
This helps boards analyse the target firms in more depth and understand the possible benefits, and 
thus pick targets that create the biggest strategic and operational synergies (Wang, Xie and Zhu 2015). 
Besides valuing, the better-informed boards having better analysis of the acquisition can also prevent 
firms from making bad acquisitions or obstruct value destroying management empire-building 
(Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). Moreover, directors having industry experience can increase the boards 
cohesiveness through increased boards communication and understanding, and furthermore through 
the usage of industry specific skills and knowledge improving the board’s monitoring efficiency 
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(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). They claim these to be crucial characteristics in decision-making, thus 
improvements can prevent the board from approving value-destroying acquisitions.  
Directors with industry experience have two ways to possibly create value through advising-channel. 
First, industry expertise can be seen as a bargaining power, which allows experienced directors to 
value companies more precisely and lower the information asymmetry (Custódio and Metzger, 2013). 
The lower information asymmetry comes as experienced directors might possess such information 
that only industry experts can have and enable boards and managers to have deeper understanding of 
the target firm (Wang, Xie and Zhu 2015). Second, industry knowledge holding directors can assist 
managers when making complex deals and provide legal-insight of the industry, thus making better 
deals and acquisitions.  
Based on these possible positive effects of the directors’ industry experience I construct my first 
hypothesis as follows: 
H1a) Boards having more directors with industry experience make better performing acquisitions. 
Wang, Xie and Zhu (2015) state that besides positive experience effects, experienced directors can 
also have a negative effect on the firm’s acquisition performance. They state that industry experience 
can alternate the difference between the board and management, as experienced directors may share 
common industry-networks. This may affect acquisition performance negatively as the board’s 
monitoring weakens and sympathy and emotions are more likely to affect the target picking. This can 
also excite managers to drive their own interest (e.g. empire-building) and thus increase agency 
problems. Supporting this network effect, directors having industry experience can be inside 
directors5 having experience through their extensive career. The CEO and management may drive 
their own interest by appointing inside directors (Adams and Ferrera, 2007; Masulis and Mobbs, 
2011). Their studies state that these directors are linked with management and may share interest 
more in line with the management and CEO than with the shareholders. This weakens the boards 
monitoring abilities through information asymmetry and increase the likelihood of value-destroying 
acquisition (Adams and Ferrera, 2007; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). Also, if many directors possess 
industry experience, the board may be more homogenous. Prior study has found homogeneity6 to 
make boards work less efficiently and weakening critical review of managements suggestions and 
                                                          
5 I refer to inside directors as directors having managerial position in the acquiring firm. 
6 Homogeneity in this context refers to low diversity in job, employment, industry and educational 
characteristics of the board members. 
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decisions, thus making firms more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999).  
Industry experience can make directors overconfident regarding their knowledge and overvalue 
potential synergies and overprice the target firm. Also, Güner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) state 
directors, who have financial experience, can guide the board and shareholders towards approving 
value-destroying acquisitions. Similar to this, I expect the same to be possible with directors having 
industry expertise as it increases their credibility in the eyes of other board members and shareholders 
in advising the acquisition-related topics.  
As industry experience may have negative effects, I construct my alternative hypothesis as follows: 
H1b) Boards having more directors with industry experience make more bad performing acquisitions  
I measure two different experience-effects: board experience and employment experience. The 
second hypothesis examines the difference between these two experiences. I expect the effect of 
employment experience to be stronger, in a positive or negative way, than board experience. I base 
my argument on the fact that employment experience can be seen more industry specific and more 
practical. Board experience on the other hand, is not so industry specific and has common tasks 
regardless of the industry, such as management monitoring and advising, where the industry 
experience can be an asset, but not necessary. Thus, I state my second hypothesis as follows: 
H2) Employment experience has a stronger effect on the acquisition performance than board 
experience. 
3. Sample data 
3.1 M&A transactions 
I include to my sample all successful domestic M&A-transactions made by publicly listed U.S 
companies. The timeseries for my transactions is from January 2003 to December 2013, as relevant 
board data I have available is up to year 2013.  
My sample consists of M&A transactions that have a disclosed dollar value and the acquirer is taking 
over 50% interest of the target company (i.e. the company must hold less than 50% ownership to the 
target company and over 50% after the transaction).  
Also, I require the acquiring company to have board information in the BoardEx North America-
database, financial statement information available at Compustat and stock return data available at 
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CRSP -241 - -41 trading days prior the announcement date and between -1 and 1 around 
announcement day.  
Following Wang, Xie and Zhu (2015) and Field and Mkrtchyan (2017), I exclude transactions where 
acquiring company’s primary SIC-code starts with 6XXX (financial companies) and with 49XX 
(utilities) as these industries greatly differ from others and are regulated.  
Besides acquirer-specific characteristics, similar to Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), I require the 
deal value to be at least 10% of the acquirer’s market value 4 weeks prior the announcement day and 
to have a minimum value of $ 1M, as smaller transactions could add noise to my sample. 
3.2 Board and director data 
Acquirer’s board of directors is received from BoardEx North America-database. I search the 
acquirer’s sitting board and the needed board information reported on the fiscal year the acquisition 
was announced. The time series is the same as in acquisitions, covering from January 2003 to 
December 2013. The board data is the limiting factor of my time series as the BoardEx-data isn’t 
available for me after 2013.  
Given all these conditions, my sample includes 1249 transactions by 841 unique acquirers. Yearly 
transactions can be found in the Appendix 2 
3.3 Director experience 
First, I collect each acquiring board’s sitting directors’ unique ID’s and use them to search directors 
earlier board and employment history available at BoardEx. I consider relevant industry experience 
to be within 10 years prior the announcement day as industries develop over time and thus older 
experience might be outdated and not relevant (Wang, Xie and Zhu, 2015). My timeseries extends 
from January 1993 to December 2013. I collect each director’s firms in which he or she has worked 
or been a director in the past 10-years before the announcement. I identify these companies’ historical 
primary standard industrial classification (SIC) code from Compustat Historical segments-database 
using CIK-code or Ticker symbol as a company identifier. As private firms’ information is limited 
and requires extensive amounts of research, I complement my data using BoardEx-industry 
definitions and complement firms’ missing industry information by allocating these firms with SIC-
code which appears most often in specific BoardEx-industry definition.  
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Then following earlier similar studies (e.g. Wang et.al. 2015) I construct 2 dummy-variables to 
measure directors having target firm’s industry experience, one for the board experience and the other 
for employment experience outside the acquiring firm. The board experience variable (𝐵𝑖) is one, if 
the director 𝑖 has been a director in a firm within 10 years, which has the same two first digits of the 
primary SIC-code as the target company7 and otherwise zero. The employment experience variable 
(𝐸𝑖) is one, if the director 𝑖 has been in an employment position in a firm within 10 years, which has 
the same two first digits of the primary SIC-code as the target company and otherwise zero. If director 
board and employment history data is not found, I mark the director as having no relevant industry 
experience.8  
Second, I construct my two main variables Bex and Eex. I calculate both variables as a fraction of the 
acquirer board’s directors, who have relevant industry board or/and employment experience.  
Bex: 
∑ 𝐵𝑖
𝐷
𝑖=1
𝐷
      (1) 
Where 𝐵𝑖 is the board experience variable and 𝐷 is the number of director’s sitting on the acquiring 
company’s board during the acquisition fiscal year. The mean (median) percentage with board 
experience is 30% (25%). 
Eex: 
∑ 𝐸𝑖
𝐷
𝑖=1
𝐷
       (2) 
Where 𝐸𝑖 is the employment experience variable and 𝐷 is the number of director’s sitting on the 
acquiring company’s board during the acquisition fiscal year. The mean (median) percentage with 
employment experience is 12% (0%). 
Following Wang, Xie and Zhu (2015), I include variables Percentage with board experience x 
Diversification (DBex) and Percentage with employment experience x Diversification (DEex) to my 
model in order to seize the experience effect in diversifying acquisitions. 
                                                          
7 Target company’s primary SIC-code is received from the SDC Mergers and acquisitions database 
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4. Methodology: 
4.1 Announcement returns 
To calculate the market-adjusted returns for the acquirers around the announcement day, I use a 
factor-model. As a factor-model, I use the Fama French three-factor-model (Fama and French, 1993), 
which is greatly used in finance-related studies regarding abnormal returns. First, I do cross-sectional 
OLS regression to estimate the Fama French three-factor-model parameters 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖, 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖 and 
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖 for each acquirer 𝑖 daily stock returns over [-241, -41] trading days relative to the 
announcement day of the acquisition: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖
(SMB)𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖(HML)𝑡    (3) 
Where the 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is daily return of the acquirer 𝑖 primarily traded common stock on trading day 𝑡 received 
from CRSP accounting for dividends. Other variable values are received from the Kenneth French’s 
website.9 The (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) stands for returns on the market portfolio minus the risk-free return rate, 
SMB𝑡 is the size factor and HML𝑡 is the value factor.  
Next, I calculate the abnormal daily returns around the announcement day for every acquirer 𝑖 using 
the estimated parameters from the above regression, where ?̂?𝑖 is the intercept parameter and ?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖 , 
?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖 and ?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖 are the estimated slopes for the market abnormal return, size and value 
respectively.  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 − ?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖
(SMB)𝑡 − ?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖(HML)𝑡   (4) 
Last, I calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the acquirer 𝑖 between [-1,1] around the 
acquisition announcement day. The mean 𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1,1] of the sample of 1249 transactions is 0.25%. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1,1] = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
1
−1       (5) 
4.2 Change in return on assets 
Following Custódio and Metzger (2013) and Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) I calculate the change in 
return on assets from one fiscal year before the announcement to one fiscal year after the 
announcement for each acquirer. I calculate the 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 for acquirers as following: earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets of the firm. Then I calculate the change in return on 
asset as following:  
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 −  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1     (6) 
                                                          
9 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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when 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 is the return on assets one fiscal year before the announcement and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 is the 
return on assets one fiscal year after the announcement. The mean change of 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is -1.3%.  
4.3 Control variables 
All control variables and definitions are given in the Appendix A. In this section: the control 
variables, the theories from earlier researches and the expected sign of the effects on acquirer’s 
acquisition announcement returns are discussed. 
4.3.1 Acquirer related characteristics 
Size: Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) found that small acquisitions made by small acquirers 
had a positive relationship between announcement returns and large acquisitions made by large 
companies had negative relationship between announcement returns. They indicate that a large firm’s 
negative returns come from both larger premiums and lower synergies. Thus, I expect the size-effect 
to be negative. Samples mean (median) for 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 is US$ 2.833 billion (US$ 0.551 billion) 
Leverage: Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) argue that acquirers having higher leverage 
receive higher announcement returns. The leveraged company’s higher returns come from reduced 
agency costs and improved managerial decision making (i.e. managers are more cautious and prevent 
making value destroying acquisitions). Thus, I expect the effect of leverage to be positive. The mean 
(median) Leverage of the acquiring companies is 22% (17%), 
BHAR: Study by Rosen (2006) finds that acquirer’s announcement returns are inversely related when 
they are compared to the acquirer 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). The sign of the 
effect is thus unpredictable, as it depends on the acquirer’s past performance. The samples mean 
(median) of 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 is 1.095 (1.010). 
Year x Industry-dummy: Harford (2005) shows that companies in the same industries tend to make 
mergers at the same point of time creating merger waves. Following Custódio and Metzger (2013) I 
seize these industry and year specific effects using dummy-variables.  
4.3.2 Deal-related characteristics 
Payment method: M&A literature review by Helblian, Devers, Namara, Carpenter and Davison 
(2009) show that it is widely studied that cash-financed deals generate better announcement returns 
than those financed with stock. These better announcement returns are based on the argument that 
payment type signals possible under- or overvaluations of the acquiring company. Acquirers prefer 
cash-payments when they assume their firm to be undervalued and with stock when they assume to 
be overvalued. I control the payment type effect by generating 2 dummy-variables Cash and Stock. 
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In the full sample, 34.5% of the transactions were paid 100% with cash and 6% of the transactions 
were paid 100% with stock. 
Public vs. Private targets: Researches state acquirers acquiring private targets gain better 
announcement returns than those acquiring public targets (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002; 
Helblian, Devers, Namara, Carpenter and Davison, 2009) The effect comes from cross-ownership, as 
the acquiring firm’s shareholders are more likely to also hold the target company’s shares when the 
target is public and thus it would be indifferent how acquisition returns would form between acquirer 
and the target firms in shareholders point-of-view. Cross-ownership on the other hand is unlikely 
when the target is private firm, indicating higher returns to the acquiring firm. I control the effects of 
public vs private target firm with dummy-variable Public and expect the effect to be negative. In my 
sample, 22.4% of the target firms are publicly listed. 
Relative size: Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), find a negative relationship between acquirer 
returns and the relative size of the target firm, which can be see seen equal to the deal value. Thus, I 
expect the effect to be negative. The mean (median) of the Relative size is 56.5% (22.9%). 
Financial advisor: Rau (2000) studied relationship between different tier investment banks and 
acquirer announcement returns. The study focuses in differences between different tier investment 
banks and announcement returns, indicating that acquirers, who use financial advisors receive better 
announcement returns. To make my model simpler, I exclude different tier advisors and only 
construct dummy-variable Advisor. In 53.1% of the transactions the acquirer used advisor. 
Diversifying acquisition: Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1990) claim the acquirer’s announcement 
returns to be lower if the acquisition happens between industries as the acquirer is more likely to 
overpay from the target. Thus, I expect this variable to have negative effect. 33.2% of transactions 
were diversifying acquisitions. 
4.3.3. Board and director characteristics 
Board size: Yermack (1996) provides evidence that there is an inverse relationship between board 
size and firm value. The effect comes through poorer communication and reduced decision-making 
quality. As decision-making quality and information asymmetry arise, the board is more likely to 
make a value-destroying acquisition. Thus, I expect the effect of Board size to be negative. The 
rounded average amount of directors sitting on the board and the median of my sample is 8 directors. 
Independence: Byrd and Hickman (1992) discover a board’s independence to have a non-linear effect 
in acquirer’s announcement returns. They show that the acquirer’s number of independent directors 
has mostly a positive effect on the announcement return, however they state that there can be too little 
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or too many independent directors, making the effect negative. They emphasize role of the 
independent directors’ monitoring as a way to create value for the announcement returns. Also, 
Adams and Ferrier (2007) show that emphasizing director independence may have a negative effect 
as managers are less motivated to share information with board as it might increase their monitoring 
on managers. Making board’s monitoring more inefficient due to the limited information. Therefore, 
the number of directors can make the board’s operating more efficient or less efficient in decision 
making and in advising, making the firm either less or more exposed to value-destroying acquisitions. 
As the effect is mostly positive I expect it to have a positive effect in my model. The mean (median) 
percentage of independent non-executive directors in the board is 74.6% (77.8%). 
Directors financial experience: Güner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) studied different effects of 
independent directors who have financial experience. They find directors having financial experience 
to be negatively associated with announcement returns. The effect is stronger when the target is 
private as the valuation of private target is more subjective and more difficult. This may result in 
directors having financial expertise to guiding the board and shareholders into approval of value-
destroying transactions. Thus, I expect my variable to have a negative effect. The samples board’s 
mean (median) percentage of the directors with financial experience is 11.6% (11%). 
CEO duality: Following related studies (e.g. Wang, Xie and Zhu, 2015; Field and Mkrtchyan, 2017) 
I include a CEO duality variable in my model. Study by Fahlebrach, Low and Stulz (2010) find no 
effect on the announcement returns to the acquirer on the CEO duality, so I expect the effect to be 
close to zero. CEO is present in the board in 61.9% of my samples acquiring boards. 
5. Sub-sample analysis: 
5.1 Methodology 
See Table 1 descriptive statistics for the whole data and for transactions, where the acquiring firm 
have low or high board experience and employment experience. I mark firm as having high board 
experience, if the acquirer’s 𝐵𝑒𝑥 is equal or above median (0.25) and as having low if below median. 
I use the same technique in employment experience and mark firm to have high employment 
experience if the 𝐸𝑒𝑥 is above median and low if below median. As employment experiences median 
is zero, I mark boards having any employment experience as high experienced. I execute a t-test to 
measure the significance of the differences of means between low and high experienced boards 
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involved in transactions. Through the t-test I create sub-sample analysis, with which I create the 
following arguments of the differences between transactions having low and high experience10. 
5.2 Arguments 
5.2.1 Experienced acquirer receive lower announcement returns 
In both board experience and employment experience the mean difference between announcement 
returns is significantly different from the other (both p-values are <0.01). This implies that boards 
having more experienced directors may be related negatively to the announcement returns, which 
would be consistent with alternative hypothesis H1b. The difference between both experience’s 
means are around 0.02 and is thus inconsistent with H2 as the employment experience doesn’t have 
larger difference. However, there is no significant difference between in either sub-samples ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 
stating that there may not be an effect between target firm’s industry experience and long-term 
performance. 
5.2.2 Experienced companies are bigger companies 
The difference of mean non-logarithmic Size between sub-samples in board experience is ($US -
1.126 billion) and is fairly significant at 10% level. The difference between employment experience 
sub-samples is ($US -1.381 billion) and is quite significant at 5% level. These findings would suggest 
that bigger companies have more experienced directors. The earlier difference between returns is 
consistent with this finding as bigger companies tend to have lower announcement returns (Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). 
5.2.3 Experienced firms acquire more public companies 
For both board- and employment-experience the difference between public targets is significantly 
different from each other (p-value < 0.01). In both samples, around 18% of the targets of the low 
experience transactions were public whereas around 27% of the targets were public in high experience 
transactions. This finding is against hypotheses as acquiring private companies the industry 
experience would be seen as a valuable asset when valuating company, because it is harder than 
valuating public companies. Although this can be explained with acquirer’s size as Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) find that large firms are more likely to acquire public companies than 
small firms, which has a negative effect on the acquisition returns. 
                                                          
10 All other control-variables not mentioned here, have failed to have statistically significant differences 
between sub-samples means 
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5.2.4 Experienced firms are less likely to diversify 
According to the difference of means of both board and employment experience, the high experienced 
acquirers are less likely to do diversification acquisitions as both differences are statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.01). This finding can be interpreted that boards have more acquiring 
company’s industry experience than other industries experience and thus have more experience when 
the firm does within industry acquisitions instead of diversification acquisitions.  
5.2.5 Experienced firms use more advisors 
The mean difference of usage of advisor in transactions between low and high board experience is 
quite significant (p-value < 0.01) and is significant between employment experience (p-value < 0.01). 
These statistical differences argue that financial advisor is more likely to be used when directors have 
more industry expertise. An explanation consistent with prior studies and other sub-sample findings 
for the usage of financial advisor would be that advisor is more used in public acquisitions as they 
are more complex and require more skill and effort (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). 
5.2.6 High experienced board possess more experience than low experienced boards in general 
The means difference between the other expertise (i.e. board experience in high or low employment 
experience transactions and vice versa) is statistically significant (p-values < 0,001). The differences 
between experience are big (employment experience in board experience: -0.135 and board 
experience in employment experience -0.243). These results conclude, that high board experience 
transactions have almost 14% more employment experience in their boards and high employment 
experience boards have over 24% more board experience. As one director can possess both 
experience’s, it is no surprise that acquirers having either experience also to have the other experience. 
Directors can have employment experience and be chosen as a director for firm operating in the same 
industry due to the employment experience as it is considered as an important director qualification 
(Masulis and Mobbs 2011; Wang, Xie and Zhu, 2015). 
5.2.7 Amount of CEO duality is smaller in the high experienced boards. 
The difference of means between high-experienced and low-experienced boards is statistically 
significant, in both board and employment experience sub-samples the difference of means is 
significant at 5%-level. The difference between board experience sub-samples is 0.054 and 0.062 in 
employment experience. This implies that CEO is less likely to sit on a board which is high 
experienced. This could imply that other directors may possess the needed insight what CEO could 
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bring to board, such as industry experience. However, the difference is rather small stating that there 
are no huge differences between low and high experienced boards when compared with CEO duality. 
5.3 Other findings 
Other, significant at some level, findings are found from sub-samples but not in both. In the board 
experience, difference is between means of stock deals is significant at 5% level stating that high 
experienced boards are more likely to pay transaction 100% in stock and is consistent with other 
findings as transactions paid with stock receive lower announcement returns (Helblian, Devers, 
Namara, Carpenter and Davison, 2009). Significant differences of means in employment experience 
include number of directors (p-value < 0.01) implying experienced boards to be also bigger, which is 
consistent findings and prior studies that bigger firms have bigger boards (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 
2008). However, the difference between means (-0.531) is quite small. Also, in the employment 
experience the difference between board independence is fairly significant (p-value of 0.048), but the 
difference between means is also small (-0.015). 
6. Models 
6.1 Main regression-models 
To test the hypotheses H1a and H1b I construct cross-sectional OLS models where I regress the 
acquirers’ announcement returns individually for the both board experience and employment 
experience variables. All regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and t-stats are 
based on them. Also, by regressing both experiences in separate model’s ceteris paribus I test the 
hypothesis H2.  
My main OLS-models are the following: 
Bex-Model1: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗[−1,1] =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝐵𝑒𝑥𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑗 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖  (6) 
Eex-Model1: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗[−1,1] =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑥𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖  (7) 
Where the acquirer’s three-day announcement returns are 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗 the 𝐵𝑒𝑥𝑖 and 𝐸𝑒𝑥𝑖 are the experience 
of the target firm’s industry explained in section 3.3. The 𝑋𝑖 stands for acquirer 𝑖 specific 
characteristic control-variables (including the year x industry dummies), The 𝑌𝑖𝑗 stands for control 
variables regarding the deal characteristics between acquirer 𝑖 and target 𝑗 and the 𝑍𝑖 are the control 
variables for board characteristic for the acquirer 𝑖, all control variables in each category are explained 
in section 4.3. 
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I test the long-term effects and hypotheses H1a and H1b of the director experience by regressing 
change in the ROA (∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖) in models below and definition as explained in section 4.2, with same 
right-hand variables and their definitions as in my main regression-models. As in earlier models, I 
regress the experiences separately to test my hypothesis H2. 
Bex-Model1: ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝐵𝑒𝑥𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑗 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖   (8) 
Eex-Model1: ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑥𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑍𝑖    (9) 
I also test, if the effect differs in diversification acquisitions by adding to the board experience 
regression variable Board experience x Diversification (DBex) and the variable Employment 
experience x Diversification (DEex) to the employment experience to the models above. None of the 
other variables aren’t modified or removed. 
    Variable added to the Board-experience models, DBex: 𝛽𝐵𝐸(𝐵𝑒𝑥𝑗 𝑥 𝐷𝑖𝑣)       (10) 
    Variable added to the Employment-experience models, DEex: 𝛽𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝑒𝑥𝑗  𝑥 𝐷𝑖𝑣)      (11) 
6.2 OLS-regressions results: 
6.2.1 The effect of director’s industry experience on target-firm 
The results of my main cross-sectional OLS regressions of the acquirer announcement returns CAR 
[-1, 1] are presented in Table 2. Models and coefficients in Table 2 are defined in equations Appendix 
A.  
Coefficient Bex is -0.054 and is economically and statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) in the 
director board-experience model (Bex-Model1). Coefficient Bex suggest that acquirers board 
experience has a negative effect and adding one standard-deviation of board experience in the 
acquirer announcement return decreases by 1,3%. This finding is in line with hypothesis H1b. A 
significant effect of director’s board experience is new to the literature. However, the sign of the 
effect is in line with the earlier related studies in which the coefficient wasn’t significant (Wang et.al. 
2015; Custódio et.al. 2013). In Bex-Model2, variable DBex is added to the previous model. The effect 
of board experience is -0.055 and is slightly increased and is more statistically significant at 1% level. 
The finding suggest that board experience has a negative effect in within industry acquisition returns 
for the acquirer and thus support the hypothesis H1b. The new variable DBex appears to have positive 
effect on diversifying acquisitions returns, implying boards with experience make better performing 
diversification acquisitions, however the effect is not statistically significant. The signs of the effects 
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are in line with Wang, Xie and Zhu (2015), who found significant positive effect of independent 
director’s experience in diversification acquisitions.  
Bex-Model1 Eex-Model1 Bex-Model2 Eex-Model2
Director experience
Bex -0.054 ** -0.055 ***
(-2.29) (-2.767)
Eex -0.050 *** -0.052 ***
(-2.637) (-2.76)
DBex 0.008
(0.203)
DEex 0.014
(0.193)
Board characteristics
Board size -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013
(-0.729) (-0.768) (-0.707) (-0.734)
Board independence 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
(1.142) (1.144) (1.144) (1.124)
CEO duality -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.200) (-0.265) (-0.196) (-0.25)
Deal characteristics
Financial experience -0.049 -0.044 -0.049 -0.044
(-0.796) (-0.705) (-0.810) (-0.707)
Public -0.040 *** -0.041 *** -0.040 *** -0.041 ***
(-3.620) (-3.698) (-3.582) (-3.652)
Diversifying -0.010 0.000 -0.011 -0.001
(-1.259) (0.025) (-0.930) (-0.054)
Stock 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.012
(0.551) (0.418) (0.536) (0.403)
Cash 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.185) (0.087) (0.174) (0.077)
This table test relationship between directors’ industry experience and acquisition announcement returns by presenting estimates
of the cross-sectional ordinary least square estimation for sample of 1249 U.S. domestic M&A transactions announced between
1/2003 and 12/2013 and acquirer’s being publicly listed companies. The dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day
cumulative abnormal returns CAR[-1,1] (Fama-French three-factor-model) in percentage points on acquirer’s common stock
between the window of [-1,1] trading days relative to the announcement day. In Bex-Model1 and Bex-Model2, The Bex is the 
percentage of directors having previous board-experience on a company having the same 2-digit primary SIC-code as the target
firm in the prior 10 years before the acquisition announcement year. In Eex-Model1 and Eex-Model2, The Eex is the
percentage of directors having previous board-experience on a company having the same 2-digit primary SIC-code as the target
firm in the prior 10 years before the acquisition announcement year. In Bex-Model2, the DBex is the Bex times 
Diversification- control variable. In Eex-Model2, the DEex is the Eex times Diversification- control variable. The *, **and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively for the heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics reported in the
parentheses. All variable definitions are given in Appendix A.
Director experience and the acquirer's announcement returns
Table 2
Table 2 continues on the next page
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Next, the first employment-experience model (Eex-Model1) furthermore appears to support the 
hypothesis H1b. The employment experience has a negative effect and it is highly economically and 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) and the coefficient has a value of -0.05. Again, the sign of 
the coefficient is in line with prior literature (Wang et al. 2015; Custódio et al. 2013). The effect is 
smaller than in board experience implying the employment-experience having a minor effect 
compared to the board-experience and therefore is against hypothesis H2. Adding variable DEex in 
model Eex-Model2 has similar effect than in the board-experience model. The variable Eex stays 
highly statistically significant at and has a slightly effect (-0.052) than in the earlier model. This 
finding also supports the hypothesis H1b. The employment experience effect in the diversification 
acquisitions appears to have positive and stronger effect than in the board-experience model 
supporting the H2 although the finding isn’t reliable as the variable is statistically insignificant.  
Considering these findings, I thus reject the hypotheses H1a and H2. 
6.2.2 The impact of the control variables 
No other board-characteristics than the experience-variables were found to be statistically significant. 
The signs of other board-characteristics though seem to have the expected signs being in line with 
prior literature (e.g. Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Güner et al., 2008). 
Acquirer characteristics
Advisor 0.027 ** 0.029 ** 0.027 ** 0.029 **
(1.970) (2.051) (1,981) (2.022)
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.648) (-0.483) (-0.663) (-0.487)
BHAR -0.014 * -0.015 * -0.014 * -0.015 *
(-1.745) (-1.809) (-1.717) (-1.750)
Leverage 0.034 ** 0.032 ** 0.034 ** 0.032 **
(2.150) (1.990) (2.135) (1.982)
Size -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 ***
(-2.628) (-2.643) (-2.699) (-2.655)
(Intercept) 0.135 *** 0.105 ** 0.136 *** 0.104 ***
(3.304) (3.079) (3.394) (3.042)
Year x Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1249 1249 1249 1249
R
2 0.123 0.119 0.123 0.119
F-statistic 1.310 1.260 1.299 1.249
Table 2 continued from the previous page
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When it comes to deal specific control-variables, there is a statistically highly significant, 
economically and statistically, effect (all p-values < 0.01) between acquisitions with public target 
firm and the acquirer returns. The coefficient’s Public effect on acquisition returns is negative ranging 
between -0.04 and -0.041, and is thus consistent with prior studies (Fuller et al., 2002; Helblian, et 
al., 2009). Also regarding the deal-characteristics there is statistically significant positive effect of 
having a financial advisor in the announcement returns for the acquirer. The Advisor coefficient 
ranges between 0.027-0.029. As the effect is positive, it is consistent with prior literature (Rau, 2000) 
regarding advisor, although the measurement of the advisor was simplified. Other deal-characteristics 
fail to have statistically significant effects, but signs of the coefficients: Diversification and Cash are 
in line with prior studies (Morck et al., 1990) and (Helblian et al., 2009) respectively. Other 
statistically insignificant deal-characteristics seem to have differing signs from what was expected 
according to the prior researches. 
Control-variables regarding the acquirer characteristics, in all four models, the acquirer’s Size has a 
negative coefficient having value of -0.01 (when rounded) and all results are statistically significant 
having p-values < 0.01. This implies a negative effect between the acquirer’s size and the acquisition 
returns to the acquirer. This is in line with prior studies with size and acquisition returns (e.g. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). Other acquirer variables are also significant at some level. BHAR is 
slightly statistically significant (p-value < 0.1) and has a negative effect. Leverage shows positive 
effect between acquisition announcement returns and is economically and statistically significant (p-
value < 0.05). These two acquirer characteristics control-variables signs are also in line with the 
relevant literature such as Rosen (2006) and Maloney et al. (1993) respectively. 
6.3 Long-term performance 
The cross-sectional OLS regression models of my post acquisition performance, measured by the 
change in ROA one year prior the announcement to the ROA one year after the announcement 
(∆𝑅𝑂𝐴), are presented in Table 3. The long-term performance models and the coefficients are 
explained in equations (8), (9) and in Appendix A. 
6.3.1 Board experience 
First board-experience model (Bex-Model1) shows a positive relationship between board experience 
and change in operating efficiency measured with ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴. This would imply that experienced boards 
do pick their targets with higher synergies and improve the operating efficiency of the firm, however 
the coefficient isn’t significant and thus I find no evidence to support that board experience actually 
make these positive changes in firms. Expanding this paradigm to the Bex-model2 where the DBex 
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variable is added to the model ceteris paribus, it shows similar results. Both coefficients Bex and 
DBex have positive signs referring to a positive effect between change in operating efficiency, but as 
both coefficients are statistically insignificant, I find no support of board experience for both 
hypotheses H1a and H1b. 
 
6.3.2 Employment experience 
In my first employment-experience model (Eex-model1) similar results arise from the regression. 
Employment-experience shows a positive effect between the change in return on assets, but no 
conclusions can be made as the variable is statistically insignificant. In the next Eex-model2, where 
the DEex is added to the model ceteris paribus. The Eex-coefficient turns negative, but stays 
statistically insignificant. However, the added variable DEex-coefficient is strongly positive but also 
not statistically significant, although it is close to statistical significance (p-value 0.109).  
Bex-Model1 Eex-Model1 Bex-Model2 Eex-Model2
Bex 0.008 0.005
(0.485) (0.279)
Eex 0.006 -0.011
(0.142) (-0.261)
DBex 0.015
(0.417)
DEex 0.139
(1.604)
Board characteristics control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal characteristics control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirer characteristics control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year x Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1130 1130 1130 1130
R
2 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.209
F-statistic 2.176 2.175 2.158 2.184
This table test relationship between directors’ industry experience and acquisition announcement returns by presenting
estimates of the cross-sectional ordinary least square estimation for sample of 1130 transactions announced where U.S.
domestic publicly listed companies are as an acquirer between 1/2003 and 12/2013. The dependent variable ∆ROA is 
the change in acquirer’s return on assets (EBIT/Total Assets) from one fiscal year before the announcement to one
fiscal year after the announcement. In Bex-Model1 and Bex-Model2, The Bex is the percentage of directors having
previous board-experience on a company having the same 2-digit primary SIC-code as the target firm in the prior 10
years before the acquisition announcement year. In Eex-Model1 and Eex-Model2, The Eex is the percentage of
directors having previous board-experience on a company having the same 2-digit primary SIC-code as the target firm in
the prior 10 years before the acquisition announcement year. In Bex-Model2, the DBex is the Bex times 
Diversification -control variable. In Eex-Model2, the DEex is the Eex times Diversification- control variable. The *,
**and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively for the heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics
reported in the parentheses. All variable definitions are given in Appendix A.
Director experience and the acquisition long-term performance
Table 3
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These findings suggest that there is no effect between directors’ experience with the acquirer’s change 
in return on assets. However, it could be possible that experienced director plays role in the acquirer’s 
future operating performance, but this effect doesn’t come through the acquisition itself. This is 
further discussed in the chapter 7.3.  
As there are no statistically significant results all hypotheses are rejected and the findings suggest that 
there is no effect between director experience and in the long-term acquisition performance. 
7. Interpretation of results, issues and robustness 
7.1. Firms having experienced boards perform worse in within-industry acquisitions 
The most interesting result of my study is that the board- and employment-experience have a negative 
effect on the acquirer’s announcement returns in non-diversifying acquisitions. As argued in the 
hypothesis H1b, the effect may be a sum of effects through both the monitoring- and advising-
channels. Most likely effect is ought to come from monitoring-channel from impaired decisions 
quality through homogeneity, independence of directors and industry networks.  
7.1.1 Monitoring channel 
As many directors have industry experience, the board becomes more homogenous and may lack of 
conflicts between management and board. In moderate amounts, these conflicts enable the use of 
critical and investigative processes which may question the CEO’s and management’s strategic 
decisions (Forbes and Milliken 1999). They state that because of these conflicts the management may 
be required to justify and clarify their decisions and consider alternative solutions, increasing 
monitoring and decision-making quality. Thus, homogeneous boards may impair decision-making, 
predisposing the firm to shareholder-value-destroying acquisitions. In addition, experienced boards 
can be more sympathetic to managerial problems weakening the monitoring and inciting managers to 
drive their own interests over shareholders e.g. empire-building value-destroying acquisitions (Wang, 
Xie and Zhu 2015). Experienced boards are better at monitoring CEO actions, but the CEO might 
intentionally decrease or avoid increasing the monitoring. CEO may trust in his own skills too much 
or have own incentives and therefore may not share all needed information regarding the acquisition 
with the board, making boards harder to evaluate the acquisition and decrease decision-quality 
regarding it (Adams and Ferriera, 2007).  
Earlier literature has shown that inside-directors are more likely to be chosen to the board by their 
specific expertise, such as industry expertise (Masulis and Mobbs 2011, Wang, Xie and Zhu, 2015). 
Thus, it may be that experienced directors are more likely to be inside directors. Supporting earlier 
decision-making argument, prior literature finds that inside directors are more likely to be chosen for 
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their close relationship with CEO than their contribution to the board (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). 
This is related to poorer decision-making and monitoring as inside directors are less likely to 
challenge CEO’s opinions, are more supportive to the management’s initiatives and may have more 
common interests with management weakening boards monitoring-quality and driving the firm to 
make shareholders value-destroying acquisitions.  
7.1.2 Advising-channel 
Industry experience can have negative effects regarding the valuation of the target company and its 
synergies. In addition to CEO’s experienced directors may also be overconfident of their industry 
knowledge and overvalue the synergies and the target firm. Earlier discussed emotions and networks 
may additionally affect experienced directors in advising the target picking. Thus, the firm may not 
choose the optimal target as experienced directors might have social-ties with the target firm and even 
possibly be themselves employee or director in the target firm. This argument is supported by Ishii 
and Xuan (2014), who state social connections between the acquirer and the target have a negative 
effect on the acquisition returns. Social ties could furthermore explain, why the effect negative effect 
is only in non-diversification acquisitions, as companies operating in the same industry have more 
social-ties than companies between industries.  
Directors with financial experience can guide the board and shareholders towards approving value-
destroying acquisitions (Güner, Malmendier and Tate, 2008), this can also be the case with industry 
experience as experienced directors may have more credibility and noteworthiness in the acquisition 
advising-process. 
7.2 Robustness 
I perform additional cross-sectional OLS-regressions to test the robustness of my main regressions 
results of the effect of director’s industry expertise on acquirer returns.  
First, I regress my models acquisition announcement Bex-Model2 and Eex-Model2 for two different 
sub-samples. The first sub-sample includes acquisitions that are less significant measured by relative 
size, (Robust Models (1) and (2)). The other sub-sample includes more significant acquisitions 
measured by relative size and transaction value (Robust Models (3) and (4)). The results are shown 
in Table 4. The board experience is robust in both sub-samples and show similar results as my main 
regressions. However, employment experience is less robust, as it stays statistically significant in less 
significant transactions sub-sample but loses statistical significance in more significant transactions 
sub-sample. The signs of the experience-effects are in line with original model. 
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Also, Robust Models (5) and (6) test that my model isn’t biased by the measurement style, I 
implement alternative way to measure experience in my main regressions models Bex-Model2 and 
Eex-Model2. I replace both board and employment experience with dummy-variables, which are 
equal to one if the board has any board or employment experience depending on the model. Otherwise 
the model remains the same. The DBex and DEex variables are changed by being one if the acquirer 
has any experience and does diversification acquisition. The board experiences coefficient 𝐵𝑒𝑥 stays 
highly statistically significant at 1% level in the Robust Model (5) and the sign stays negative. The 
𝐷𝐵𝑒𝑥 remains insignificant. The 𝐸𝑒𝑥 coefficient seems to be robust, as it is as well in line with my 
main models and remains statistically significant in both models at 1% level. The 𝐷𝐸𝑒𝑥 remaining 
insignificant. 
7.3 Issues  
Endogeneity and omitted-variable bias are typical concerns of the corporate governance and 
acquisition-related research. Faleye et al. (2012) and Wang et al. (2015), state the possibility that 
regression can have negative relationship between both board- and employment-experience and 
acquirer returns, by just capturing some general effects of director quality rather than the impact of 
specific industry knowledge. I try to exclude this possible bias from my regressions by changing the 
measurement of the director experience as was discussed in the section 7.2. Furthermore, there may 
be deal-specific drivers, which affect beyond my control-variables. Custódio et al. (2013) state that 
these factors may concern synergies, vertical integration synergies and deal anticipation by market.  
 
8. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have tested whether the acquirer’s directors’ experience on target firm’s industry has 
an effect in acquisition announcement returns in domestic transactions made by publicly listed 
companies in the United States. I included also test for long-term acquisition performance. I splatted 
the experience into two different experiences, board-experience and employment-experience, and 
tested, has either of them an effect. Besides analyzing the effect and differences, I furthermore 
analyzed whether the employment experience has more significant effect in the announcement returns 
and in the long-term acquisition performance. 
First, I created my sample by collecting acquirer’s directors and their relevant industry experience in 
the timespan of the study. Then I calculated the abnormal returns for the acquirer over acquisition 
announcement window. Third, I introduced relevant control variable in order to seize the effect of 
different characteristics regarding the acquirer, the deal and the board.  
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Next, I analyzed possible differences in the characteristics of low- and high-experienced boards. I 
created two sets of sub-samples and compared differences between these. I find that high-experienced 
boards: receive lower announcement returns, are bigger firms, acquire more public firms, are less 
likely to diversify, use more financial advisors, are more experienced boards in general and CEO is 
less likely to sit in the board.  
After sub-sample analysis, I regress the announcement returns on the experience-variables and other 
control-variables. My bachelor’s thesis provides new finding to the existing literature implying 
acquirer’s boards, which have experience on the target firm’s industry, receive lower announcement 
returns in non-diversifying acquisitions. Besides this, my findings imply that employment-
experience’s effect is not more significant than board-experience’s. I moreover find that the board’s 
target industry experience does not have an effect in the change of operating performance after the 
acquisition.  Otherwise results are in line with the prior researches on the subject (Wang, Xie and 
Zhu, 2015; Custódio and Metzger, 2013). My findings suggest that experienced acquirer’s boards 
should question more the managements acquisition proposals and have more critical approach when 
estimating the possible synergies regarding the acquisition, where the target is closely related to the 
firm through the same industry. 
For further research, the director’s expertise could be moreover divided into inside- and independent 
director’s having experience, as I discussed the possible differences in the effects regarding the 
independence of director’s. Thus, this could polish the research questions I raised in my bachelor’s 
thesis by providing more information regarding how the director experience effects the acquisition 
performance. The tests could also be done with many different M&A samples to see whether the 
effect is universal. 
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Appendix A. 
 
11 
                                                          
11 The mathematical formulation for the BHAR variable. 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 =
∏ (1+𝑅𝑖𝑡)
−41
−241
∏ (1+𝑅𝑚𝑡)
−41
−241
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definitions
Panel A: Acquirer characteristics
Size 
Leverage
BHAR
Industry x year-dummies
Panel B: Deal characteristics
Cash
Stock
Public
Relative Size 
Advisor 
Panel C: Board characteristics
Diversifying
Board size 
Independence
Financial experience
CEO duality 
Is equal to one, if the payment is fully paid with stock and otherwise zero
The natural logarithm of acquirer’s market capitalization 4 weeks prior the announcement day
recieved from SDC Mergers and acquisitions database.
The ratio of acquirer total debt to total assets at fiscal year previous to the announcement day.
The acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the window of [-241, -41] trading days before the
acquisition announcement day, the R it  and R mt have same definitions as in equation 1
1
.
The dummy variable equals 1 if the acquisition happens on specific a year on a specific Fama
French 12-industry and is otherwise zero.
Is equal to one, when the payment is fully made in cash and otherwise zero.
The fraction of Non-Excecutive Directors with past CFO or FD role sitting in the acquirer’s board.
NEDs with past CFO or FD role is Recieved from BoardEx North America database
Is one, if the CEO is also a board member during the acquisition and otherwise zero. Recieved from
BoardEx North America database
Is equal to one, if the target firm is public and otherwise zero. 
Is defined as a fraction of the deal value and the acquirer’s market capitalization 4 weeks prior the
announcement day.
Is one if the acquirer has used financial advisor marked in the SDC Mergers and acquisitions
database, and otherwise zero. 
The dummy-variable is one, if the acquirer and the target firm’s first 2-digits of primary SIC-codes
aren’t identical, and otherwise zero. The acquirer's and target's primary SIC-codes are recieved
from the SDC Mergers and acquisitions database.
The natural logarithm of the number of director’s sitting on the acquirer’s board in the fiscal year
during the announcement day. Number of directors sitting in acquirer's board is received from the
BoardEx North America database
A fraction of independent directors in the acquirer’s board. Amount of NEDs is recieved from
BoardEx North America database
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